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Stuff of boundaries? Kyrgyz–Russian marriages and the 
actualization of ethnic difference  
Mathijs Pelkmans and Damira Umetbaeva 
 
Abstract What are ethnic boundaries made of? How do people come to experience such 
boundaries? Notwithstanding the formidable analytic attention to the role and effects of 
boundary drawing in social life, such questions are rarely asked. We look at the apparently 
stable boundary between Russians and Kyrgyz villagers in the Issyk-Kul region to trace how 
its dimensions were naturalized through settler colonialism, Soviet modernization, and post-
socialist upheaval. But even if naturalized, the boundary behaves as a “presence absence” 
whose relevance fluctuates and whose momentary features remain unpredictable, as we 
demonstrate by focusing on transgressive mixed marriages between Russian and Kyrgyz 
villagers. 
 
1. Introduction 
Marina showed us her family album as we were enjoying a late-night cup of tea on 
her porch in July 2015.
1
 The pictures showed Marina and her husband Azat looking 
smart at birthdays, weddings, and the occasional outdoor activity. “We were so 
happy,” Marina commented, “I got on with all his relatives, we were like one happy 
family. My mother-in-law, she absolutely loved me; she taught me all the Kyrgyz 
                                                 
1
 The ethnographic data contained in this article were collected through a combined four months of 
fieldwork in the villages of Grigorievka and Mikhailova, both located in Issyk Kul province in north-
eastern Kyrgyzstan, in 2015 and 2016. The project was purposely designed as a joint effort, allowing us 
to study the topic of mixed marriages from different ethnic and gendered positionalities. In this article 
we have replaced the names of our interlocutors with pseudonyms that reflect their social, cultural, and 
generational background.  
2 
 
customs.” We were interrupted by her son Timur, eleven years old, who had spent the 
past hour and a half looking up facts about London in an encyclopedia and wanted to 
have them confirmed. After he went off to bed Marina commented: “he is so into 
books, we call him our ‘scholar’ (uchennyi). They say this about metises [people of 
mixed descent], don’t they, that they often are very intelligent.”
2
 We proceeded to 
discuss other typical characteristics of metises, including that they are considered 
particularly beautiful, something that Marina also saw confirmed in her own son. Not 
that he was always having it easy at school, and in fact he did not have many friends. 
According to Marina this was due to Timur being different from both the Russian and 
the Kyrgyz children in his group. “When you look at him, it’s immediately clear that 
he is neither fish nor fowl. And you know how kids are,” she added in a slightly 
downcast voice. The conversation returned to Marina and Azat’s marriage: “We were 
together for more than ten years. But now? It is all over. His brothers and sisters don’t 
even greet me anymore when I pass their house.” This was particularly awkward 
because they were all living on the same street. Marina had briefly paused, but then 
firmly concluded the conversation: “Only seven months have passed [after Azat died], 
and it is as if nothing ever existed! If they don’t want to deal with me—fine! —but it 
is the boy that I feel sorry about.” 
*** 
This straightforward story of a mixed marriage and its messy afterlife can be seen as 
emblematic of interethnic relations between Kyrgyz and Russians in rural settings.
3
 
                                                 
2
 In Russian and in Kyrgyz the word metis, as in English, refers to a person of mixed descent or to a 
hybrid when applied to non-humans. It is related to the French métis and the Spanish mestizo. 
3
 We use these ethno-national labels as emic terms, following local definitions that are based on 
bureaucratic logic and usually follow the paternal line. 
3 
 
Mixed marriages between Russians and Kyrgyz are rare, but they do exist. While such 
marriages potentially bridge the intercommunal divide, they tend to release tensions 
that push towards a remarking of the boundary. In fact, the story could be interpreted 
as a literal illustration of Barth’s classic statement that “boundaries persist despite a 
flow across them” (1969: 9). And actually, the persistence of the boundary in this case 
is wholly unsurprising given that the differences between Russians and Kyrgyz are 
hardly ever questioned by anyone. The differences are described as obvious by the 
involved: Russians are Orthodox Christians and are Europeans while Kyrgyz are 
Muslims and are Asians; they have different languages, family structures, forms of 
hospitality, and codes of conduct. Moreover, these differences are seen to have always 
existed, predating the time that Kyrgyz and Russians started to interact regularly in 
what is now Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul province.
4
 
It may not be obvious why this apparently stable boundary would be a good 
starting point to revisit the topic of ethnic boundaries. As mentioned, all that we seem 
to be ending up with, at first sight, is confirmation of the old if important Barthian 
insight that groups are produced through boundary work, one that has since become a 
truism. But actually this underscores the rationale of our approach. It appears to us 
that while much anthropological attention has been paid to the effects of boundary 
drawing (bordering), the boundaries themselves are rarely scrutinized. And ironically 
this is linked to Barth’s famous and productive insistence to focus on “the ethnic 
boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses” (1969: 15).
5
 
                                                 
4
 Issyk-Kul province, named after the 181-kilometre-long Issyk-Kul Lake that dominates the region, is 
in the north-east of Kyrgyzstan and borders on Kazakhstan to the north and China to the east. 
5
 Our own approach is clearly influenced by this famous statement of Barth, as well as by Abbott’s 
later provocative phrasing that “we should not look for boundaries of things, but things of boundaries” 
(2001: 261). Similar to these approaches we start with processes of binding and bounding instead of the 
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Although rightly seen as a milestone in the move from an essentialist to a 
constructionist approach in anthropology (Vermeulen and Govers 1994; Wimmer 
2008), Barth has had remarkably little to say about the “stuff” that boundaries are 
made of. This is less contradictory than it sounds. Basically, what Barth is saying is 
that rather than the cultural stuff explaining sameness and difference, it is the 
boundary that explains (differences between) the cultural stuff. In this shift the 
boundary becomes the explanans (that which explains) rather than the explenandum 
(that which needs to be explained). Resultantly, the boundary as such has often ended 
up being taken for granted.
6
 Our approach is to collapse the old Barthian insight onto 
itself. If Barth argued that the analyst’s attention needed to shift from the essentialist 
“cultural stuff” to the organizing “ethnic boundary,” we suggest that redirecting some 
of the attention to the “stuff” that makes up boundaries produces new insight in the 
flows and blockages that constitute the always patchy sociocultural fabric. For the 
purposes of scrutinizing what boundaries are made of, and for studying how actors 
experience and engage the “stuff of boundaries” , a solid looking boundary is a 
convenient starting point. 
It would be unfair to ignore Barth’s later efforts to develop a multivalent 
understanding of boundaries. In fact, three decades after having produced his seminal 
work, Barth distinguished between three interrelated aspects: “1. Literally, boundaries 
divide territories ‘on the ground’; 2. More abstractly, they set limits that mark social 
                                                                                                                                            
categories (cultural, ethnic, national, or other) upon which these processes acts; but we differ in that we 
focus on how the boundaries themselves are experienced and constituted. 
6
 Without denying the value of works that describe the “multidimensional” and “liminal” qualities of 
boundaries (e.g. Akkerman and Bakker 2011; Lamont and Molnar 2002), or that differentiate between 
stable and unstable boundaries and tease out the factors that account for variation (Wimmer 2008; 
2013), we stand by our claim that this provides little insight in the experiential realities of boundaries. 
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groups off from each other; 3. And finally, they provide a template for that which 
separates distinct categories of the mind” (2000: 17). These aspects can readily be 
applied to the topic at hand. The territorial aspect can be taken to refer to the 
configurations of social life—related to residential patterns, work and leisure 
activities, and networks of friends and relatives—that cluster Kyrgyz and Russians 
differently and separately. The second aspect concerns the “limits” that regulate 
engagement, and according to which economic and neighborly interactions between 
Kyrgyz and Russians in public contexts are valued neutrally, while intermarriages are 
deemed problematic. Finally, boundary refers to the “categories of the mind” that 
prompt different and often opposing connotations; here, the ethnic labels Russian and 
Kyrgyz are paired with long lists of nouns—food, dress, music, skills, what have 
you—that together produce a template of difference between Russians and Kyrgyz.  
And yet, even though it is useful to tease out these cognitive, social, and 
spatial dimensions, the emphasis continues to be on the effects of boundaries rather 
than on the boundaries themselves. The boundary itself remains elusive. Reflecting on 
this elusiveness may provide further insight into why the “stuff of boundaries” has 
received insufficient analytic attention. As Barth did in the previous paragraph, the 
Oxford English Dictionary uses the notion of “limit” in its definition of boundary: 
“boundary, n. 1. that which serves to indicate the bounds or limits of anything 
whether material or immaterial; also the limit itself.” This wording is helpful because 
it highlights that the boundary constitutes both a presence (as the indicator of the 
limit) and an absence (as the limit itself). In other words, we are talking about 
boundaries as “lines” and as “gaps,” qualities that are complexly interrelated.  
It is here that we can productively return to Marina’s story, and take serious 
her memories of “one happy family” and her astonishment that suddenly it was “all 
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over.” Marina’s experiences with an alternately dissipating and emerging boundary 
suggested a non-totalizing social field in which her journey interacted with the 
“intensities” and “affects” of her milieu to produce a situationally contingent “sense 
of boundary.”
7
 While in Marina’s story the absence and presence of the boundary was 
sequentially arranged, Callon and Law’s reminder that “presence can be absence, and 
the absent present” (2004: 3) is pertinent to this boundary as well. Experientially, the 
boundary recedes into the background when naturalized, while taking front stage 
when challenged.  
In short, while the term “boundary” is generally used to invoke precision and 
linearity, its experiential properties are elusive. Thinking of groups and boundaries, 
we suggest that our analytical move resembles Brubaker’s (2004) important reminder 
that one should not assume the existence of “groups” but rather analyze the 
fluctuating intensities of “groupness.” Arguing that boundaries should likewise be 
questioned, we are similarly interested in fluctuating intensities, that is, in how the 
clarity and fuzziness, the rigidity and porosity of boundaries change over time. The 
issue is that boundaries are complex and unstable constructs, and can therefore not be 
represented in straightforward ways without doing violation to their “emergent 
qualities.”
8
 That is, boundaries attain some of their features only in the course of 
                                                 
7
 The phrase “sense of boundary” is a liberal reference to Sarah Green’s (2012) phrase “sense of 
border” which she uses to capture the way borders are experienced. While she focuses on territorial 
borders and describes long-term processes, we use “sense of boundary” to describe how sensory 
experiences of boundaries are situationally contingent.   
8
 Deleuze uses the term “emergence” together with “actualization” and “becoming” to underscore the 
uncertainty of process. He uses becoming in subject-oriented passages (becoming animal, etc.) and 
actualization and emergence in relation to essences and phenomena (see 2004: 233-234, 306-307).  
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human action and interaction.
9
 Moreover, by analyzing the making and unmaking of 
boundaries we also aim to identify the cognitive, social, and affective “stuff of 
boundaries.” We understand boundaries to have ontological, epistemic, and existential 
attributes, while emphasizing that these attributes slip in and out of focus, and are 
transformed even while they are reproduced over time. 
The “stable” boundary between Russians and Kyrgyz serves as a foil against 
which to theorize emergence, with the aim to demonstrate that boundaries do not only 
have real effects but attain their features through social and cognitive engagement. To 
illustrate these emergent qualities, we focus in section three on acts of engagement 
that are particularly consequential on a personal and interpersonal level: mixed 
marriages between Kyrgyz and Russians. Because these marriages are transgressive, 
they intensify a “sense of boundary” among the involved, while sparking societal 
responses aimed at remarking the boundary. We identified several tendencies in the 
social trajectories of the marriages as “boundary objects” (Akkerman and Bakker 
2003). A first tendency was to marginalize the couple, a restorative act which 
normatively affirmed the boundary; a second tendency was to encapsulate one of the 
marriage partners into the other side, something which restored the social fabric. But 
while the couples often went along with these restorative tendencies they sometimes 
rejected the underlying ethnic logic, setting the stage for a reconfiguration of the 
social fabric. Following the trajectories of these mixed marriages thus provides deeper 
insight into how boundaries are both reproduced and transformed. Moreover, it shows 
the importance of paying attention to how boundaries are experienced, a topic we 
                                                 
9
 In a study of the Spanish–Moroccan frontier, Driessen shows how it is in ritual and ceremony that 
features of ethnic boundaries become tangible (1992). Inspired by his approach, we look at how 
elements of the boundary emerge in the life trajectories of villagers. 
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highlight specifically towards the end of this article. First, however, we need to 
explore how this “stable” boundary came into being, which we do by documenting the 
historical process through which differences between Russians and Kyrgyz came to 
be naturalized, and these categories were asymmetrically infused with power (cf. 
Stoler 2002). 
 
 
2. Naturalized Differences and Contested Hierarchies  
Nuriza, an unmarried Kyrgyz woman of twenty years old, found it difficult to 
comment on Russian men as potential husbands. It was not that the topic made her 
feel uncomfortable, but rather that she had hardly ever given it thought. When we 
probed why she couldn’t conceive of a Russian as a potential spouse, her response 
was telling: “I don’t know.” The not-knowing was significant because it suggested the 
generally unquestioned nature of the boundary between Kyrgyz and Russians, its 
absent presence. Still, after some reflection Nuriza mentioned: “Well, I think, you 
know, with them, it’s that they have a different outlook on life. They can, for 
example, leave their family. For us it is all about responsibility, but they do not have it 
[a sense of responsibility] like that. They can just leave.” And she added: “The thing 
is that their traditions are simpler than with us Kyrgyz.” 
Nuriza had plenty of experience with Russians. She had lived her entire life in 
Mikhailovka, one of the ten to fifteen so-called “Russian villages” in Issyk-Kul 
province, which were thus named because they had been founded by Russian settlers 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and used to have a majority 
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“Russian” population (the label included Ukrainians) until the 1990s.
10
 In Soviet 
times Mikhailovka had the reputation of being an advanced and modern village, a 
reputation that was based on its early electrification and asphalted village roads, its 
thriving collective farm with impressive technical support unit, and its vicinity to the 
provincial capital of Karakol. This modern reputation was shared with most other 
Russian villages in the region, and was contrasted with the more peripheral and 
“backward” Kyrgyz villages that specialized in animal husbandry.  
Although many Russians had migrated to Russia after 1991, Mikhailovka still 
had a significant Russian minority of roughly 25 percent when Nuriza attended 
school. She had followed the Russian-language curriculum, with classes evenly split 
between Russian and Kyrgyz pupils and having mostly Russian teachers. Throughout 
her schoolyears she had interacted with her Russian classmates, several of whom she 
had called her friends. The frequency of interaction had dropped since graduation, but 
Nuriza kept herself updated about their lives. Like many villagers, she ascribed to the 
view that the local Kyrgyz had more in common with local Russians than with 
Kyrgyz from other regions or from more peripheral villages in Issyk-Kul region.
11
  
And yet, when we asked about interethnic romances, Nuriza knew of only one 
such case. At the time, this relationship—between a Kyrgyz boy and a Russian girl—
                                                 
10
 Fieldwork was carried out in Mikhailovka and Grigorievka, both of which had been established in 
the early twentieth century, and up until 1991 had a predominantly Russian population of respectively 
around 4,500 and 6,000 inhabitants.  
11
 Schröder (2017) observes a similar configuration in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek, where Russians 
and urbanized Kyrgyz clustered together to distinguish themselves from Kyrgyz migrants arriving from 
more rural or peripheral origins and were seen as lacking in culture. Also similar to Schröder’s urban 
case is that alliances between Kyrgyz and Russians rarely “go beyond the status of being 
acquaintances” (2010: 454). 
10 
 
had looked like a normal friendship between schoolmates, but it later turned out to 
have been a romantic affair. The exceptionality of such relationships was also 
conveyed when Nuriza answered a question about Russian boys being interested in 
Kyrgyz girls: “Whether or not they looked at us [romantically], they probably thought 
it better to be just friends.”
12
 What stood out from this discussion was the extent to 
which the boundary between Kyrgyz and Russians was presented as a natural one, a 
fact of life implicit in the villagers’ way of being.  
These naturalizations of difference can be understood as the sediments of what 
Strathern (1988) calls “domaining,” the historical process by which labels are infused 
with coherence, meaning, and power.
13
 That is to say, the patterns of engagement 
between Kyrgyz and Russians are embedded in a wider historical context, a long 
conversation that started in the nineteenth century, in which the relative positions of 
Kyrgyz and Russians changed over time. It will be useful to see how elements of the 
boundary came to be arranged and how ideas about the other developed.
14
 We do this 
by providing in this section an outline of the historical conversation between Russians 
and Kyrgyz around Lake Issyk-Kul, to then explore the nature of everyday 
interactions between Russians and Kyrgyz, and return to the topic of mixed marriages. 
*** 
                                                 
12
 The taboo was particularly strong for relationships between Kyrgyz women and Russian men, and 
less stringent for Kyrgyz men and Russian women, especially after a first marriage had dissolved. 
13
 Discussing similar issues, while linking them explicitly to political processes, Stoler talks about the 
“micro-ecologies of matter and mind” that are the sediments or debris of empire (2008: 194).  
14
 This brings to mind Sarah Green’s discussion of lines, traces, and tidemarks (2018: 71), which 
inserts a temporal dimension to discussions of bordering, and draws attention to the “traces of previous 
efforts at marking a separation.”  
11 
 
The Issyk-Kul region was incorporated into the expanding Russian Empire in the 
1850s. Like in most of its new territories in Central Asia the tsarist administration had 
initially refrained from interfering in local affairs, and hence the reaction of the 
indigenous Kyrgyz population had been slight (Carrère d’Encausse 1994: 151-52). 
However, subsequent waves of Russian migration to Central Asia in the period 1892 
to 1916 radically upset this relative tranquility. Due to its fertile soils, especially at its 
eastern extremity, the Issyk-Kul region attracted a large portion of this immigration.
15
 
The continuing influx of Russian settlers and their claims on land used by Kyrgyz 
pastoralists as winter pastures fueled intercommunal tension and resentment (Brower 
1996: 53; Morrison 2015: 6). In this context, a decree by the tsarist government in 
June 1916 that required Kyrgyz men to work as laborers behind the front lines in the 
war with Germany proved explosive. Groups of Kyrgyz revolted against the Russian 
presence, an uprising that quickly turned into a massacre of Russian settlers, killing 
over 2,000 in the Issyk-Kul region alone.
16
 The Russian response, in the form of self-
armed militias and army reinforcements, was even more deadly, with killed Kyrgyz 
surpassing “by far the Russian casualties” (Brower 1996: 43-44; Morrison 2015: 18). 
In anticipation of retribution the vast majority of Kyrgyz fled across the mountains to 
China, an exodus that took tremendous human toll, and from which most survivors 
returned only after the Bolsheviks had established control in the early 1920s.
17
 
                                                 
15
 By 1916 the Issyk Kul basin counted 30,000 (mostly Slavic) settlers among 150,000 Kyrgyz, a 
proportion that in Turkestan was only surpassed by the Chui valley (Brower 1996: 51). 
16
 The revolt spread across a much larger territory in what is now Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but was 
particularly intense in the Issyk Kul region (Brower 1996: 51). 
17
 The revolt and exodus (or ürkün) was largely omitted in Soviet historiography, but has received new 
attention since Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991 (see Umetbaeva 2015; Chokobaeva 2016). 
12 
 
 These horrific events were rooted in the economic tensions between Russian 
settlers and Kyrgyz pastoralists, who were locked into a colonial system that was 
prejudiced against pastoral nomadism, seeing it as a backward mode of existence that 
was destined to give way to settled agriculture. Importantly, these tensions resonated 
with—and intensified—ideas of cultural difference between the settlers and the 
pastoralists. Morrison, for example, mentions that settlers never referred “to the 
Kyrgyz as anything other than dogs” (2015: 14), and Brower cites a Russian study 
into the causes of the 1916 massacre which reported that “the new settlers look upon 
the Kyrgyz as animals and treat them accordingly” (1996: 49). The Kyrgyz 
perspective is hardly documented, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they held 
equally dim views of Russian settlers, seeing them as barbarians with whom contact 
was best avoided (Brower 2003: 139; Pelkmans 2017: 49). The events of 1916 and 
continuing animosities in the years thereafter only deepened the divide between 
Kyrgyz and Russians.  
The Russian Revolution bolstered the position of Central Asia’s native 
population. The Bolsheviks represented an anti-colonial force that promised to 
liberate the suppressed masses. Importantly, their centrist form of government came 
to be based on an ethno-territorial principle, of which the Kyrgyz Socialist Soviet 
Republic (SSR) became one of the components.
18
 The principle recognized and 
secured the position of titular nations, meaning that the development of the Kyrgyz 
                                                 
18
 Kyrgyzstan first became an administrative unit in 1924 as the Kara Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast, 
which then was renamed Kyrgyz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic in 1926, and became a full-
fledged Socialist Soviet Republic in 1936. 
13 
 
SSR was linked to the advancement of the Kyrgyz nation.
19
 Another major change 
was the collectivization of agriculture, a key mechanism by which Soviet leadership 
aimed to break the vestiges of the past, develop its rural areas and modernize 
agriculture. But while collectivization transformed rural life in many ways, it ended 
up institutionalizing some of the differences and inequalities between Russians and 
Kyrgyz. The Bolsheviks inherited from their tsarist predecessors a disdain for 
nomadism, which was married to the high modernist desire of controlling population 
movement and rationalizing land use. As Kassymbekova and Teichmann (2012: 163) 
put it, “Europe remained the Bolsheviks’ blueprint for progress and development,” a 
blueprint that reinstated inequalities between Russians and Kyrgyz by prioritizing 
sedentary agriculture over pastoralism (see also Loring 2014: 83). 
The division of labor between collective farms around Lake Issyk Kul 
followed ethnic lines, which in itself was unsurprising because these collectives were 
established on the basis of preexisting settlement patterns (see Collins 2006: 86). 
Kyrgyz collective farms specialized in wool and meat production, Russian ones 
focused on crop cultivation. And when collective farms were fused into larger units 
and as a result became more ethnically mixed, as happened in Grigorievka and 
Mikhailovka after 1950, the division of labor continued to be based on ideas of 
cultural competency. The shepherds, veterinarians, and most milkmaids were Kyrgyz, 
while Russians worked in the field and held jobs as technicians and in the farm 
administration.
20
 Outside the collective farm Russians tended to work in technical and 
                                                 
19
 The new administrative format required fixed ethno-national labels. This was a contentious process 
when group affiliation rested on tribal, occupational, or residential patterns rather than “ethnicity” (e.g. 
Hirsch 2005), but such contentions did not concern the distinction between “Kyrgyz” and “Russians.”  
20
 A local publication on Grigorievka illustrate this ethnic division of labour. Its 1970s pictures of 
“cattle-breeders” show only Kyrgyz, and those of “toilers” only Russians (Sereda et al 2009: 41, 83).  
14 
 
educational, as well as in administrative positions. The vast majority of the Kyrgyz 
were employed in the collective farm, but they were also relatively well represented in 
the police force, and increasingly so in service jobs (see also Loring 2014: 96, 99).  
Although these asymmetric patterns somewhat varied across the region and 
fluctuated with time, they persisted through the Soviet period and affected many 
domains of social life. The inequalities were enhanced by the dominance of the 
Russian language in official settings and which was hence aspired to by upwardly 
mobile Kyrgyz. In Russian villages, most self-styled modern Kyrgyz families would 
endeavor to furnish their homes European style, and they would dress and cook in 
ways that emulated an image of modernity that unavoidably had Russian 
connotations. By contrast, Russians would never speak Kyrgyz in public, even if 
some were able to understand Kyrgyz from years of exposure. Nor would they 
consider eating with bare hands while seated on felt carpets on the floor “as the 
Kyrgyz do,” a practice that came to be seen as primitive by many local Kyrgyz as 
well.  
Ever since the 1930s, the Soviet state had displayed a favorable attitude 
towards intermarriage. It was seen as an indicator that nationalities were drawing 
together (Dunn and Dunn 1973), and associated “with the arrival of modernity in 
‘backward’ areas” (Edgar 2007: 587). In Central Asia, marital bonds between Russian 
women and native men especially (the reverse rarely occurred) were viewed 
positively because it was expected that a Russian wife would have a civilizing effect 
on the family, and spearhead change in native communities (ibid., 589). Thus, while 
presented in terms of internationalism, the bias towards “modernity” also meant a bias 
towards things Russian and “European.” But whereas marriages between Russians 
and Kyrgyz became somewhat more common in urban settings, they continued to be 
15 
 
the exception in rural contexts.
21
 In fact, we were unable to locate a single Russian – 
Kyrgyz intermarriage in either Grigorievka or Mikhailovka that was contracted before 
the 1990s. 
By the late 1980s the largely rural Issyk-Kul region had a population of 
360,000 of whom 40 per cent or 150,000 were classified as Russian and 55 per cent as 
Kyrgyz. These proportions changed radically after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. 
By 1999, the region had 413,000 inhabitants, of whom only 13 per cent or 53,000 
were classified as Russian, with an additional 0.6 per cent or 3,000 as Ukrainian 
(Burzhubaeva et al 2001: 528).  The crumbling of the welfare state and massive 
unemployment had produced uncertainties for the population at large. But for Russian 
inhabitants, these difficulties were compounded by anxiety about their position in an 
independent Kyrgyzstan. While previously Russians had felt secure and indeed 
superior to “Asians” in the Russian-dominated Soviet Empire, they had been 
transformed into an ethnic minority overnight.  
In her book Children of Empire, Kosmarskaya (2006) documents the sense of 
confusion, insecurity and fear that pervaded the Russian minority in the 1990s. Her 
respondents—many of whom lived in Grigorievka—mentioned the constant rumors 
of violence, of people being robbed and killed. And although most had not personally 
experienced such acts of violence, they had all feared to end up as the last Russians 
left behind in Kyrgyzstan, having missed the opportunity to leave. The largest wave 
of Russian emigration occurred in the early 1990s, but the Russian community has 
                                                 
21
 Between 1959 and 1979 the percentages of ethnically mixed families in the Kyrgyz SSR rose from 
18.1 % to 23.1 % in urban contexts, and from 5.5 to 5.9 % in rural contexts (Gorenburg 2016: 147). 
These percentages cannot be applied directly to Kyrgyz – Russian marriages, because most of these 
documented mixed families consisted of people considered to be close, such as Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, 
or Russians and Ukrainians (see also Edgar 2007: 586-88).  
16 
 
continued to shrink since then. Important factors here are the ongoing economic crisis 
and the ethnicization of political life and public service, which reduced opportunities 
for Russians (Peyrouse 2008: 13). Most “Russian villages” still have a significant 
Russian minority, but their proportion does not exceed 30 per cent in any of them. 
*** 
Official Soviet discourse had always emphasized the importance of cooperation 
between nations in the building of socialism in each of its Republics, a trope that 
resonated with the ideals of “modernity” in Russian villages. Consider the following 
passage from a locally produced historiography of Grigorievka:  
 
We used to live in friendship, as one large international family: Russians, 
Kyrgyz, Balkars, Uighurs, Kazakhs, Belarusians, and Ukrainians.
22
 With the 
entire village, we achieved victory in socialist labor. Many villagers wore on 
their chests with pride the medals Hero of Socialist Labor, the Order of Lenin, 
the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and the Order of the Badge of Honor 
(Sereda et al 2009: 7, translated).  
 
As the excerpt suggests, the Soviet leitmotif of internationalism continued to find its 
way into popular representations of village life long after the demise of the USSR. 
And indeed, when inhabitants of Grigorievka and Mikhailovka talk to outsiders, they 
often say that the Kyrgyz, Russians, and others in their village live in harmony; or 
they will repeat the popular saying: “there are no bad nations, there only are bad 
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 This enumeration should not be read to mean that Grigorievka was ethnically highly diverse; in fact 
Russians and Kyrgyz together made up over 95% of the population. Rather the enumeration should be 
seen as a testimony to the Soviet ideal of internationalism. 
17 
 
people.” In cross-ethnic conversations it is common that stories are exchanged about 
how local Russians are sometimes teasingly called “Kyrgyz” when in Russia, and 
how Kyrgyz who travel to Uzbekistan (or even other parts of Kyrgyzstan) tend to feel 
more at home among the “cultured” and “civilized” Russians in their village. This 
discourse of internationalism is an attractive one that most established villagers are 
inclined to keep up. It projects an image that facilitates communication between 
Kyrgyz and Russians—as neighbors, as buyers and sellers in the market, and as 
colleagues. A useful way to describe such communication is “everyday diplomacy” 
(Marsden, Ibañez-Tirado, and Henig, 2016) in the sense that interactions are generally 
civil, but also diplomatic in the sense that civility is dependent on leaving much 
unspoken.  
It should thus not be assumed that relations between Kyrgyz and Russians are 
unproblematic or free of tension. The discourse of internationalism is partly a façade, 
as revealed by slips of the tongue, such as when Russians talk dismissively about 
“when the Kyrgyz came down from the mountains” or when Kyrgyz shake their head 
while referring to elderly Russians who are seen as having been abandoned by their 
children now living in Russia. Kyrgyz and Russians differ in how they integrate 
negative and positive elements in their depictions of each other. Russian teachers, 
nurses, and book-keepers repeatedly mentioned “we taught them civilization,” which 
they suggested was appreciated by the Kyrgyz. This superior attitude was easily 
maintained during Soviet times, when Russianness represented the culture of Empire, 
associated with power and civilization, and command of the Russian language was a 
prerequisite for career advancement (see also Reeves 2014: 114). To be urban and 
civilized meant speaking Russian and adopting clothing styles and eating preferences 
that were seen as modern, Soviet, European, and Russian by default.  
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Not that Kyrgyz ever completely accepted this view of Russian superiority. 
They had always talked about Russians as people without traditions, without respect 
for family, and hence as morally questionable. Russians were also said to have an 
unpleasant smell and to be untidy, which was sometimes linked to their habit of 
keeping pets in the home. With Kyrgyz independence, and the concomitant emphasis 
on “national culture,” such negative depictions became more explicit. Thus, while the 
contributions of notable Russians to village institutions were still acknowledged, this 
was often followed by the suggestion that, unfortunately, “the good Russians have all 
left.” Elderly Russians were looked upon with pity for having been abandoned by 
their children and some Kyrgyz went as far as saying that the remaining younger 
Russians were all alcoholics.  
While everyday interactions between Russians and Kyrgyz tended to be civil 
and polite, they were framed by recognition of profound differences. And importantly, 
the structures of power onto which these differences were grafted had shifted. This 
complex legacy is evident in how the topic of mixed marriages features in 
conversations. When such marriages were talked about in the abstract they sometimes 
elicited positive commentary (which revealed a racialized aesthetics). For example, 
when we asked a group of female Kyrgyz traders in the bazaar, they joked about the 
potential advantages of Russian brides: mixed Kyrgyz-Russian offspring would allow 
the Kyrgyz to shed their Mongolian appearance and to look again as their distant 
ancestors, who in the folktales used to have blond hair and blue eyes. But the other 
possibility, of Kyrgyz women marrying Russians, was inconceivable even in the 
abstract. Partly this was because religion and nationality followed the paternal, not 
maternal line; such a marriage, one of the women said, would have the girl’s family 
“be doomed to the seventh generation.” When we concretized the idea of mixed 
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marriages by asking Kyrgyz parents if they would approve if one of their children 
proposed to marry a Russian, most simply rejected the idea (see also Kosmarskaya 
1996: 128).  
What we witness here is a complex historical entanglement of “regimes of 
truth” (Stoler 2002: 2). The colonial and racist perspective of tsarist Russia had been 
partly overwritten by the Soviet rhetoric of “internationalism” that nevertheless kept 
intact the idea of Russia as the “older brother,” which in the 1990s was reconfigured 
into a religiously colored Kyrgyz nationalist discourse. Differences between Kyrgyz 
and Russians were naturalized even in the face of such significant geopolitical 
changes; with actors agreeing on their uniqueness and incompatibility. As “everyday 
diplomacy” this recognition of difference allowed for cooperation in transactional, 
professional, and neighboring spheres; as (thinly) disguised condescension it kept the 
other at a distance and set limits to acceptable interaction. Intermarriage challenges 
these naturalizations of the boundary. Precisely because mixed marriages violate the 
rules of engagement, they offer an insightful lens on how elements of the boundary 
emerge, intensify, and reconfigure.  
 
3. Patchwork and the Mixing of Marriages 
When asked about mixed marriages, residents of Mikhailovka and Grigorievka tended 
to answer with “sure, we have many of those,” to then realize that such marriages 
were actually quite rare.
23
 These exceptional marriages illuminate multiple 
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 We identified six marriages between Russians and Kyrgyz in Mikhailovka and seven in Grigorievka, 
which amounts to less than one per cent of all marriages. We acknowledge that this does not include 
people from these villages who entered a mixed marriage but are living elsewhere. In all thirteen 
instances we reconstructed the genealogies of wife and husband and collected additional information 
on residence, professional, educational and socio-economic background, and labour historites. In most 
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dimensions of the ethnic boundary. Mixed marriages violate boundaries by crossing 
lines of normative behavior, while also potentially tying together two social networks, 
that is, bridging the gap (or boundary) between them. Conceptualizing boundaries 
simultaneously as classificatory lines and as gaps in social networks is important for 
analyzing the complexity of boundaries, including the enabling and disabling aspects 
of “bordering.” The question that needs answering here is how the “line” and “gap” 
qualities of boundaries emerge and then interact with these transgressive marital 
relationships. Moreover, how do the connecting and dividing aspects relate to larger 
configurations centered on kinship, locality, and religion? By analyzing these 
mechanisms of bordering and boundary crossing (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 187) we 
aim to see not only how mixed marriages were stitched into and cut out of the wider 
social fabric, but also better understand the experiential texture or “stuff” of 
boundaries. 
The selected cases reflect different tendencies in how the complications of 
mixed marriages were dealt with by the marital couples and their extended families. 
As mentioned we distinguish between three logics. “Marginalization” refers to the 
tendency pathologize such marriages and to exclude them from established patterns of 
interaction. “Encapsulation” refers to the relatively complete and exclusive integration 
of one marriage partner (usually the bride) into the network of the other. 
“Reconfiguration” refers to changes in the modes of connectedness, indicating here a 
shift from ethnically to religiously modulated forms of sociality. These logics of 
                                                                                                                                            
instances we managed to interview both husband and wife, often more than once. Of these thirteen 
marriages we provide elaborate discussions of five in this article, while drawing on the others to 
provide further contextualization. The relatively small number of cases prevents us, however, from 
making significant quantitative claims. 
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encapsulation, marginalization, and reconfiguration are responses to boundary 
transgression, but although they clearly have restorative aims, in doing so they affect 
the texture of those boundaries in potentially transformative ways. 
 
Marginalization 
As mentioned, when mixed marriages occur, these tend to be between Kyrgyz men 
and Russian women; marriages between Russian men and Kyrgyz women are 
unacceptable from a Kyrgyz perspective. In Grigorievka, however, there was one such 
exceptional couple. Whenever villagers mentioned this marriage they highlighted its 
unusual and complicated aspects: that Igor was Aigul’s senior by thirty years and that 
Aigul had been destitute because of the alcoholism of her first (and Kyrgyz) husband. 
Aigul repeated these same points in her first conversation with Damira, in an apparent 
attempt to legitimize her marriage to a Russian man. Aigul then emphasized that even 
now she lacked security—for all she knew Igor could walk out on her any day. It 
came across as a remarkable statement for a 45-year-old woman to express in a first 
conversation with another Kyrgyz woman about her 75-year-old husband, with whom 
she had lived for twenty years and shared three children (in the ages of fourteen, 
twelve, and nine). But the statement corresponded with the widespread idea of 
irresponsible Russian men, as voiced earlier in this article by Nuriza.  
Presented here in bold strokes, the couple’s story had started in the immediate 
post-Soviet years, in 1994, when Igor was a direct colleague of Aigul’s abusive first 
husband. After the situation at home spiraled out of control, and lacking alternatives, 
Aigul and her two-year-old son moved into the small empty house situated in Igor’s 
courtyard. At the time Igor was still living with his first and Russian wife in the main 
house, creating what Igor jokingly referred to as an “interesting situation.” This 
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situation lasted until Igor’s first wife migrated to Russia to join their adult daughter 
and her family, after which Aigul moved into the main residence. Not long thereafter 
Aigul’s son died, producing a sense of loss that was further intensified by the refusal 
of her first husband to attend his own son’s funeral. 
Relationships with relatives on both sides became strained. On Igor’s side, this 
was only partly attributable to the sensitivities of intermarriage. Rather, his kinship 
network was already unravelling due to the emigration of numerous relatives, the 
disintegration of the Russian community more generally, and tensions connected to 
the complex domestic situation with two women living in the compound. Igor’s son 
had already left the house and was living a five-minute walk away. He was the only 
direct relative with whom Igor continued to be in regular contact. Relatives on Aigul’s 
side had been dismayed when she moved in with Igor, and they refused meaningful 
contact for many years. Aigul reflected on these tensions with some bitterness, saying 
they were “to be expected.” Ties had been partly restored in recent years, and the 
couple had attended some family occasions. Igor mentioned how during one such 
occasion he had talked with his wife’s relatives about his Kyrgyz roots—Igor’s 
grandfather had been Kyrgyz
24
—which reportedly had facilitated the rapprochement.     
Aigul and Igor’s marital union was unusual in many ways, but several of the 
described elements surfaced in other mixed marriages. As was the case here, most 
mixed marriages were contracted between partners who had previously been married. 
Clearly, the objections of parents and other relatives were less intense and carried less 
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 According to the story, Igor’s father was born around 1900 as the child of a Russian mother and a 
Kyrgyz father, and although mother and child lived in the Russian community, this heritage was said to 
have saved their lives during the 1916 intercommunal violence.  
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weight with second marriages.
25
 What is more, mixed couples tended to be from 
incomplete families or be partial outsiders to their own communal circles. This was 
true for Igor whose relatives had already moved to Russia, as well as for Aigul who 
felt abandoned by her relatives when her first marriage broke down. The act of 
intermarriage produced a backlash that eroded social networks, with mixed couples 
being less visited and invited by relatives, or excluded from reciprocity networks. The 
straining or even severance of relationships with relatives and the negative portrayal 
of the marriage marginalized this particular couple, which together with the adoption 
of stigma by Aigul powerfully reproduced the ethnic boundary.
 
 
 
Encapsulation  
Not knowing exactly where Lena lived, we asked a group of Kyrgyz neighborhood 
kids in which house the “Russian daughter-in-law” (orus kelin) was living. They had 
no idea who we were talking about. The reason was not that the kids did not know 
her, but that Lena did not fit the label “Russian,” as we realized after having located 
the household. Lena welcomed us to her small house on the edge of the village, where 
she and husband Jenish had been living for a couple of years with their three young 
children. Chickens ran across the grassy courtyard, which was hemmed in by stables 
for their two cows. Lena’s blond hair, blue eyes, and fair skin certainly made her look 
Russian, but in most other respects she came across as Kyrgyz. She spoke impeccable 
Kyrgyz with her children, wore a headscarf as all married Kyrgyz village women do 
(Russian women wear a headscarf only in old age), and also her way of keeping the 
house came across as Kyrgyz rather than Russian.  
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 Cleuziou (2016) similarly finds that in Central Asia second marriages are far less accentuated, and 
that parents have less of a say in the decision-making process.   
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We had already been informed that Lena was born on the south side of Lake 
Issyk-Kul and had been kidnapped by her husband, a fairly common road to marriage 
among Kyrgyz, but not Russians (see Borbieva 2012; Werner 2009). We asked her to 
tell us more about her life story: 
 
“From birth I am Russian, but my parents they were alcoholics. I don’t have 
any feelings for them. They sold everything: the house, the land, and they left 
me on the street. When I was eleven years old—in the fifth grade—I was 
taken into the house of a Kyrgyz family. They are the ones who raised me. 
That is why I don’t smoke, don’t drink. And I did everything. I took care of 
the sheep, milked the cows. That’s also why my husband kidnapped (ukral = 
stole) me … I had the reputation of being a good hardworking girl [she laughs 
with a hint of pride] . . . That was five years ago [when she was twenty years 
old]. My husband didn’t know me; he had only seen my picture on a phone.”  
 
Presenting this story as an example of a mixed marriage is not unproblematic. After 
all, socially speaking Lena had already become Kyrgyz by the time she was 
kidnapped. She still maintained occasional contact with her birth-brother living five 
hours away, but had no contact with her birth-parents. She had thus already become 
part of Kyrgyz networks, so that the act of marriage did not require her to cross 
significant social or cultural boundaries. Nevertheless, her Russian origins and 
physical appearance could not be completely erased. For example, it was because of 
her Russian origins that another intermarried Russian woman (Marina, who featured 
in the introduction) made efforts to make Lena feel welcome in Mikhailovka. Indeed, 
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while the Kyrgyz neighborhood children did not perceive Lena as different, most 
adults did,
26
 and hence the marriage was referred to as a successful mixed marriage. 
 During one of our conversations, husband Jenish recounted how he had found 
out about Lena. A cousin had shown him a picture and told him: “She is Russian, but 
she was raised by a Kyrgyz family.” For Jenish this was important, because “there are 
many girls, Russian ones, who drink and smoke, but for a Muslim that is not right.” 
His parents were skeptical when he brought Lena home. “They scolded me: ‘Why a 
Russian girl!?’” But apparently, they had come to terms with it quickly. Lena had put 
on the joluk (headscarf) after some resistance and had thereby signaled her consent to 
the marriage. She also adopted Islam— “they did not force me, they just said it was 
the right thing for a proper marriage” —after which a moldo (mullah) carried out the 
wedding ritual (the nike or nikah). Lena’s adoptive parents fully participated in the 
elaborate gift exchanges through which marriages are consolidated and the families 
become connected: “They gave us a washing machine, kitchenware (posuda), and a 
cow.”
 27
  
For the first two years of their marriage, the couple had lived with Jenish’s 
parents. Lena mentioned that her parents-in-law fully accepted her: “they were 
surprised about how much I knew; that they did not have to teach me everything 
about how to be a kelin (daughter-in-law).” As was the case with Lena, so are all 
young brides who marry into a Kyrgyz family expected to first live with their in-laws 
and submit to the authority of the mother-in-law. This is a challenging time even for 
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 Lena mentioned that strangers invariably “act surprised” when discovering that she is more fluent in 
Kyrgyz than in Russian. 
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 Elaborate discussions  of weddings and gift-giving in Central Asia can be found in Werner (1997), 
McBrien (2006). 
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Kyrgyz brides, but for Russian brides who are unfamiliar with Kyrgyz customs and 
have different expectations of married life it is a particularly demanding trial.
28
 The 
difficulties were cited in the stories of several Russian women who had married 
Kyrgyz husbands. One of them referred to it as having been “treated like a slave,” 
after which she had returned to her parents and the marriage was broken off.
29
 But 
when successful, it was through these mechanisms of integration and encapsulation 
that the Russian bride was turned into a proper daughter-in-law, thereby restoring a 
temporarily breached boundary.  
Lena’s encapsulation suggests a successful restoration of the boundary. Which 
is not to say that it was entirely secure. Ironically, while the encapsulation was 
successful not least because Lena had severed her ties with her biological (Russian) 
parents, Jenish tried to convince Lena that her biological mother should move in with 
them to help in the household. Jenish was asserting the importance of kinship and the 
role of blood-relatedness in Kyrgyz views of sociality, but in doing so he potentially 
destabilized the boundary. Lena’s refusal to give into this pressure— “he doesn’t 
know what he is talking about” —had ended the matter at least temporarily, but it 
demonstrated the absence-presence of the boundary, in the sense that boundaries may 
dissipate to then unexpectedly reassert themselves again.  
 
Reconfiguration 
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 See Turaeva (2017) for a general discussion of the role of kelin in Central Asia and Ismailbekova 
(2014: 377-379) for a concise discussion of the kelin within the “typical” Kyrgyz marriage. 
29
 We documented two instances in which the Russian bride terminated the marriage in the first 
months. This was a relatively straightforward procedure because these marriages had not been 
officially registered and in contrast to marriages between Kyrgyz had not been accompanied by an 
extensive exchange of gifts between the families. 
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Our first encounter with Bakyt lasted for no longer than ten minutes. We sat down in 
front of his house for a conversation and told him of our interest in mixed marriages. 
When we asked about his own marriage to Olga, a Russian, he replied: “So what?” 
Why would nationality even be an issue?” His rhetorical combativeness conveyed 
awareness of the sensitivities involved, while claiming that ethnicity or nationality 
should not matter. The response fitted Bakyt’s appearance. His beard and white hat 
(dopo) indicated involvement with the conservative Islamic piety movement Tablighi 
Jamaat, which has been active in the region since the late 1990s and professes that 
faith supersedes ethnic and national differences (Pelkmans 2017: 102-09). Bakyt 
explained that he had joined the movement after his first (and Kyrgyz) wife had died 
five years previously. The Tablighi Jamaat had become the gravitational center of his 
social life, and he gave the impression that he shared this commitment with Olga, who 
had converted to Islam. 
If the previous two sub-sections demonstrated how marginalization and 
encapsulation counteracted the transgressive effects of mixed marriages, here we see a 
different logic at work. From Bakyt’s point of view, religious commitment and 
purpose rendered issues related to ethnicity and culture irrelevant. His answers 
suggested that he and Olga had transcended this ethnic logic and had inserted 
themselves into a faith-based network. This seemingly clear example of 
reconfiguration turned out less straightforward when it transpired that Olga held a 
different view on the matter. Meeting Olga separately, she said that she was “not very 
religious,” and spoke frankly about the difficulties of reconciling the religious and 
ethnic differences of their extended families. The discrepancy between the 
perspectives of Olga and Bakyt suggested that ideas of cultural difference can be 
tenacious even in the face of religious renewal that dismisses them as irrelevant.  
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Bakyt and Olga’s marriage was not the only one that challenged the ethnic 
logic. One other mixed marriage suggested the possibility of transcending ethnic 
distinctions through religious renewal, though this time pointing in a protestant 
Christian direction. Margarita’s parents had lived in Grigorievka for over forty years. 
They had considered themselves Orthodox Christian, even though their involvement 
in religious activities had been minimal, as was true for most local Russians in Soviet 
times. But when protestant churches became active in the region in the 1990s, 
Margarita’s parents joined the Baptist Church. Margarita, born in 1990, grew up in 
this faith-based community, so when she entered university in the provincial city of 
Tokmak she joined the local Baptist Church, which is where she met Maksat. His 
parents were both Kyrgyz, but his father had died when Maksat was still very young. 
His mother had raised him by herself, removed from direct relatives, in Tokmak, 
where she had converted to Christianity.  
Maksat said that he had initially resisted his attraction to Margarita, had 
prayed regularly for guidance in these matters, but had then understood that God was 
directing him towards Margarita. She had been skeptical when he proposed: “I had 
not expected it, and I was also afraid to marry a Kyrgyz.” Margarita was especially 
worried about her parent’s response, but when she finally broke the news she was 
relieved that contrary to her expectations, “father told me that I am the one who has to 
live my life, not he.” The Baptist congregation similarly approved of the marriage, but 
it had provoked criticism from others. Margarita’s friends from school warned her 
about the difficulties of being a “daughter-in-law” (kelin) in a Kyrgyz family, while 
her parents were repeatedly asked, in accusatory fashion: “how could you give your 
daughter to a Kyrgyz!?” On the Kyrgyz side, the techniques of othering conveyed pity 
and intrigue. Elderly female relatives had asked Maksat’s mother with thinly veiled 
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pity: “how is it, having a Russian daughter-in-law?” which expressed worry about 
compatibility with proper household arrangements. Maksat himself remembered that 
several of his cousins had asked him, “so, how is it?” (nu kak?), a question that was 
tinged with curiosity about the unknown. 
However, all of this was mostly background noise. In their five years of 
matrimony the couple had visited Maksat’s paternal village only once, which made it 
easy for Maksat to laugh off any potential negative views of Margarita’s domestic 
qualities: “I didn’t marry her to serve them tea, you know,” he joked. Moreover, as 
they had both recently taken up jobs in Magadan (north-eastern Siberia) their lives 
were becoming increasingly detached from extended kinship networks, and were 
grafted instead onto their closest relatives and the church in Magadan and 
Grigorievka,
30
 whose mixed congregations were wholly accepting of their union. As 
Margarita’s father expressed it: “For us [believers] nations do not exist; everyone is 
equal in God’s eyes.”  
These two cases suggest detachment from an ethnically patterned social fabric, 
and concomitant attachment to (transnational) faith-based networks. They show how 
new modes of religiosity in Kyrgyzstan may affect the ethnic boundary, not so much 
by building bridges between Kyrgyz and Russians as by making distinctions between 
them obsolete. Partly because of this, religious movements such as the Baptists and 
the Tablighi Jamaat tend to be depicted as extreme and fanatical, and as a threat to the 
cultural integrity of the Kyrgyz nation. These negative views are inescapable in the 
village context and hence it was unsurprising that Bakyt and Olga were stuck between 
two different perspectives on ethnicity and religion. Maksat and Margarita were 
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 Maksat’s mother had moved in with the couple in Magadan, and the couple had spent the summer 
months in Grigorievka, living with Margarita’s parents. 
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arguably more successful in distancing themselves from the logic of ethnic difference, 
but this was predicated on their own increasing detachment from village life.  
*** 
Taken together, the marriage narratives have suggested different ways in which 
boundaries are maintained or restored through mixed marriages. The violation of 
order could be neutralized either by encapsulating the “alien element,” or by 
marginalizing the married couple. Thus, while Lena was reclassified as an honorary 
Kyrgyz, the marital bond between Aigul and Igor was marginalized by presenting it as 
unusual and extreme. Importantly, there are two sides to the process of 
marginalization. Aigul and Igor had internalized the dominant discourse that saw such 
bonds as problematic: Aigul reproduced it by lamenting about her predicament, and 
Igor played up his Kyrgyz kinship connection to soften the tension. By contrast, the 
attempted marginalization of Maksat and Margarita took on a different quality 
because they themselves rejected the classificatory scheme, insisting that rather than 
being transgressive, their marriage had been in line with God’s plan. 
One reason for why it is productive to conceptualize boundaries as lines and 
gaps is that these dimensions are constantly in the process of emergence and 
dissipation. When Aigul moved in with Igor, she already anticipated the negative 
repercussions that her controversial (even if hardly voluntary) decision would have—
by crossing a line, a gap in the social network emerged. When Lena consented to 
marriage, she submitted not just to the authority of their mother-in-law but to a 
process of encapsulation by which the boundary (violated by the marital act) was 
being restored. Mixed marriages signify transgressive moves across lines and gaps, 
which in doing so trigger a multiplicity of reactions. These reactions may amplify the 
disruptive effect for the marital couple while dampening the damage to the wider 
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fabric; they may work to encapsulate the transgressive element; or they may start to 
produce reverberations that will potentially transform the entire figuration, such as 
when religious and cultural vectors are being rearranged.  
 
4. The Emergent Qualities of Boundaries  
“I never thought of us as different, we didn’t grow up that way,” Marina mentioned 
when reflecting on the beginnings of her relationship with Azat. They were both 
“from respected families, hard-working and cultured,” and had finished school and 
secondary education in the late 1970s. Moreover, Marina, added, “back then we were 
all Soviet people; we didn’t talk about nationality.” These statements should perhaps 
not be taken too literal, but they are nonetheless insightful. They reflect the idea that 
the established Kyrgyz and Russians in Mikhailovka shared more with each other than 
with outsiders, be they Russians in Russia or Kyrgyz in more peripheral settings. 
They also underscored the point that difference was usually downplayed in ordinary 
interactions between Kyrgyz and Russians. But this seeming absence hid its latent 
presence. As seen in the previous sections, naturalized boundaries remain unmarked 
as long as they are not transgressed. Their features are actualized in processes of 
social and cognitive engagement, meaning that the lines and gaps may emerge or 
become apparent only after crossing.  
This principle certainly applied to the story of Azat and Marina, the contours 
of which we sketched in the introduction. Although they had regularly interacted with 
people across the boundary, these interactions had mostly followed the norm. 
Significantly, their first marriages had been with people from their own ethnic 
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group.
31
 Even when in the aftermath of these marriages Azat and Marina struck up a 
relationship, many of the obstacles remained initially unmarked. They were still living 
in their separate houses and kept their increasingly regular visits semi-secret. But with 
time it became painfully clear that this state of affairs represented the limit of the 
permissible. Marina refused to move in with Azat unless they were officially married, 
while Azat was reluctant to marry because of his family’s disapproval. The stand-off 
reached a climax when Azat’s relatives tried to force his hand by proposing he 
remarried to a Kyrgyz woman. On two separate occasions they brought a prospective 
bride to his house at night, but the following morning the women were gone. 
Marina never mentioned these awkward episodes,
32
 and yet she seemed to 
acknowledge them when telling us: “I came to see how difficult it was for Azat, so I 
made every effort to make it work for him.” It was a carefully managed process, 
which among other things required that Azat reregistered the family apartment in 
Bishkek in his son’s name, thereby ensuring his financial independence. In this 
process of active engagement obstacles emerged while the network contracted, 
requiring careful maneuvering to make the marriage possible.  
*** 
According to Marina, she had been fully accepted by her in-laws after their marriage 
in 2005: “My mother-in-law, she loved me. She would always comment on how well 
I did things.” Marina certainly put effort into being integrated. She was considered a 
good kelin, meaning that amongst other things she was skilled at cooking Kyrgyz 
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 Marina’s first marriage had lasted for three years, after which she moved back in with her mother. 
Azat’s first marriage had lasted for ten years, but during the last four years his wife had lived semi-
separately in Bishkek. 
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 Two of Azat’s relatives told us about these episodes in some detail. 
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food, knew how to serve guests, wore appropriate clothing, and bowed before older 
in-laws. Her efforts at becoming a proper Kyrgyz woman, wife, and daughter-in-law 
were recognized and acknowledged. Azat, for example, appreciated her support and 
loyalty: “When I was with Azat in public he would be the master (khozhain) and I 
would be on the side. He liked that about me.” And with pride she mentioned how 
Kyrgyz children would not think of her as a Russian woman, and were confused when 
it was pointed out to them. Not all of Marina’s adaptive efforts were successful. 
Language especially proved difficult. She understood most conversations, but ran into 
a psychological barrier when speaking Kyrgyz: “it is probably because I am afraid to 
say something wrong.” 
The relevant point here is that Marina’s efforts were geared towards respecting 
the differences between Kyrgyz and Russians. Through her deliberate adjustments she 
presented herself as an exception that bridged but also re-inscribed the boundary. 
Moreover, while Marina made a conscious effort to integrate into the Kyrgyz 
network, this integration did not extend to the families at larger, as became clear in 
the months after Azat unexpectedly died in early 2015.  
*** 
“Only seven months have passed, and it is as if nothing ever existed! If they don’t 
want to deal with me—fine! —but it is the boy that I feel sorry about.” While living in 
Marina’s house in the summer of 2015, we repeatedly witnessed how tensions with 
her in-laws erupted, often over the phone. One particularly disturbing issue concerned 
the claims of Azat’s oldest son. He had already appropriated the car, but he still felt 
that he had been wronged: “Mind you, this is the son who we registered the apartment 
[in Biskhek] to, and still he makes claims (pretenduiet) to this house. As if I did all 
this just to live in this house!” Conflict about inheritance can surely divide any family, 
34 
 
but it appeared to emerge particularly fast and vicious because Marina was not 
Kyrgyz and because the extended families had never become integrated. In Marina’s 
words, “For ten years we were married, living together [in the same street], sharing 
everything. We have a son! And even so they say, ‘you are a swindler (aferistka).’”  
The marriage ended with the death of Azat and thus, logically, it seized to 
exist as a boundary object. Marina was rejected and, in a conflictual process, property 
was divided. However, their son Timur was still there. As a metis of mixed Kyrgyz – 
Russian descent, he was an anomaly, a hybrid, now of a problematic kind. His older 
(half) brother had told Marina: “Timur is not a brother to me; not as long as you are 
alive. Maybe after, maybe when he is forty, then I will be his brother.” Timur’s uncles 
(his father’s brothers) were hardly more supportive. Sure, he was allowed to play in 
their yard, but even before Marina had asked them, they had made it clear that they 
would not be contributing to Timur’s education. The issue was pertinent in 2016, 
when Timur succeeded to be accepted in the selective and prestigious but also very 
expensive Turkish Lyceum in nearby Karakol. Marina nevertheless decided to send 
him there, not just for educational reasons, but also because she felt it would allow 
Timur to find his place in life:  
 
I want Timur to be a real Muslim. I told him to learn namaz [Islamic prayer]. 
You know, Russians will never accept him as one of their own. Sure, my close 
relatives [moi blizskii] call him “our Timur.” But no. It is because of Islam. So, 
it is better that he becomes a real Kyrgyz.  
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Was it because of her own disillusioning boundary-crossing experiences, that she 
thought that her metis son—a boundary object of sorts—would not be able to navigate 
the boundary successfully? 
*** 
Reflecting on the messy aftermath of the marriage it could be argued that the marital 
possessions and son Timur were hybrids, the product of connecting networks 
(Strathern 1996). As long as husband and wife were both alive, the node in the 
network was a productive binding (cf. Ingold 2008), but with the death of the husband 
the network was cut to redirect flows and resources and restore the integrity of the 
configuration. What stood out in this discussion is how features of the boundary 
emerged in processes of engagement. The obstacles standing in the way of a mixed 
marriage only fully transpired when Marina and Azat had already started their 
relationship. By adjusting her behavior Marina not only bridged the boundary but also 
acknowledged and thus re-inscribed it. Her decision to send Timur to a Turkish school 
recreated the boundary in an unanticipated manner. It showed that while transgressive 
acts erase lines of distinction they simultaneously create incentives for reasserting 
such lines. Boundaries are continuously being reconfigured and reproduced in 
processes of social and cognitive engagement. 
  
5. Stuffy Boundaries 
This contribution has demonstrated the potential of returning to the perhaps “stuffy” 
topic of ethnic boundaries, by suggesting that a focus on the experiential reality of 
boundaries produces new insight. Half a century ago Barth (1969) importantly 
claimed that instead of seeing boundaries as epiphenomenal to cultural stuff, they 
were generative of that very stuff. Acknowledging the importance of this perspective, 
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we additionally claimed that it left the boundary itself unexamined, thus failing to 
capture the generative interlocking of “boundaries” and “stuff,” and hence the 
experiential and emergent dimensions of boundaries. 
 The boundary stuff that we examined was not necessarily material or even 
always tangible. Boundaries, similar to what Ingold suggests about places, “do not so 
much exist as occur” (2008: 1808). Although the Kyrgyz – Russian boundary was 
grafted onto naturalized differences, its phenomenal reality emerged in processes of 
social and cognitive engagement. As long as the differences remained unquestioned 
the boundary was virtually imperceptible to the involved; conversely, the boundary 
was particularly felt in transgressive moments, when its features were simultaneously 
at display and at risk. We used the notion of “absence presence” to analyze the 
implied dynamic relationship, a relationship in which links are not fixed and presence 
and absence are not opposed to each other (cf. Callon and Law 2004: 3-9). Numerous 
elements had accreted over time to constitute the boundary, but its relevance, 
figuration, and position was never predetermined.  
Transgressive mixed marriages showed these dynamics in telling detail. By 
challenging the social fabric, these marriages provoked restorative acts. The 
restorative techniques aimed to neutralize the transgression by either encapsulating 
the transgressor such as when Russian brides were rendered Kyrgyz, or by 
marginalizing the transgressors, such as when mixed couples were depicted as 
abnormal or when connections with them were severed. The transgressors assisted 
this restoration by internalizing their marginalization or by conforming to the codes of 
conduct of the group they married into. In some instances, however, the transgressors 
rejected the premises of the debate, aspiring to a religious mode of sociality that 
transcended ethnic boundaries. Moreover, efforts to encapsulate the alien element 
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could end up destabilizing the boundary by producing new hybrids in the form of 
children, or by extending the encapsulation to include mothers-in-law.  
In light of the above we suggest that it is too simplistic to say that boundaries 
structure life; rather, boundaries are created in the flow of life, and these 
actualizations influence its broader currents. It is in these processes of engagement 
that people discover and actualize ethnic differences, and potentially transcend them. 
To talk about the stuff of boundaries is to talk about the affects and intensities that 
infuse people’s milieu (Deleuze 1998: 61), particularly so in heterogeneous 
environments. These processes resist straightforward modelling, but are intensely 
experienced by those living the boundary, who intimately sense the phenomenally real 
stuff of boundaries.  
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